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Digest: Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble
and Mallory LLP
Kasey C. Phillips
Opinion by Moreno, J., expressing the unanimous view of the
court.
Issue
Does the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (“MFAA”)1 preclude
the enforcement of a valid agreement to arbitrate under the
California Arbitration Act (“CAA”)2?
Facts
In February 1999, Dr. Richard A. Schatz (“Schatz”) retained
the law firm of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP
(“Allen Matkins”) to represent him in a lawsuit regarding the
The retainer
assignment of income from a partnership.3
agreement contained a provision stating that the agreement
applied to “any additional matters we handle on your behalf or at
your direction.”4 The arbitration provision of the agreement
provided that Schatz could “line out” the arbitration section if he
did not agree to it. However, Schatz did not line out the
arbitration provision and thus agreed that “in the event of any
dispute arising out of or relating to this agreement, our
relationship, or the services performed (including but not limited
to disputes regarding attorney’s fees or costs . . .), such dispute
shall be resolved by submission to binding arbitration . . . .”5
In February 2000, Allen Matkins represented Schatz in an
easement dispute; no new retainer agreement was signed at that
time.6 Schatz paid Allen Matkins $179,088.69 for their work in
the easement case, but when he ceased payments shortly before
the case went to trial, Allen Matkins demanded an additional

1
2
3

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE, §§ 6200–6206 (West 2009).
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 1280–1294.2 (West 2008).
Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble and Mallory LLP, 198 P.3d 1109, 1112 (Cal.

2009).
4
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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$169,917.42 in a letter dated April 2003.7 Schatz failed to
respond to the letter, and in January of 2004 Allen Matkins
invoked the arbitration provision of the original retainer
agreement.8 Schatz alleged that the arbitration provision did not
apply because the retainer did not mention the easement
litigation and the reference to “additional matters” was not
Schatz also claimed that the
sufficiently emphasized.9
arbitration provision was unenforceable under Alternative
Systems v. Carey and that he was entitled to invoke MFAA and
exercise his “statutory rights to nonbinding fee arbitration, and if
he so elects, trial de novo before a jury.”10
Allen Maktins disagreed with Schatz’s assessment of the
arbitration provision but agreed to nonbinding arbitration under
the MFAA.11 When the arbitrator ruled in favor of Allen
Matkins, Schatz filed a complaint for “trial de novo, declaratory
relief, and refund of attorney fees.”12 In reply, Allen Matkins
filed a petition to compel binding arbitration under the original
retainer agreement.13 Schatz opposed, arguing that Alternative
Systems’ construction of the MFAA nullified the binding
arbitration provision.14 Allen Matkins replied, asserting binding
contractual arbitration would fulfill the MFAA’s de novo trial
requirement because the California Supreme Court impliedly
rejected the holding in Advantage Systems.15
The trial court found for Schatz and the court of appeal
The California Supreme Court granted Allen
affirmed.16
Matkin’s petition for review.17
Analysis
The court began with a comparison of the MFAA and the
CAA, recognizing them as “separate and distinct” schemes.18
While the CAA applies to almost any civil dispute, the MFAA
only covers disputes regarding legal fees and costs.19
Additionally, the obligations to arbitrate under the MFAA are
7
8
9
10

Id.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1112–13.
Id. (citing Alternative Systems v. Carey, 67 Cal.App.4th 1034 (1998)) (italics

added).
11
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13
14
15
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17
18
19

Id.
Id. (italics added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1114.
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statutory, thus, even in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate,
a client may call for arbitration under the MFAA while under
standard arbitration, both parties must agree to arbitrate. 20
Under the MFAA, an attorney cannot compel a client to arbitrate
an agreement, but a client may compel an attorney to do so.21
Arbitration awards granted under the MFAA are not binding and
either party may seek trial de novo or the parties may agree that
the arbitration is binding.22 The MFAA does not expressly
reference the CAA, but it provides that an attorney must give
written notice to a client “prior to or at the commencement of any
other proceeding against the client under a contract between
attorney and client which provides for an alternative to
arbitration . . . for recovery of fees, costs, or both.”23 In Aguilar v.
Lerner, the California Supreme Court inferred the clause “any
other proceeding against the client under a contract between
attorney and client” to include contractual arbitration under
CAA.24 The MFAA states that if an attorney engages in any
other proceedings and the client is entitled to arbitration under
the MFAA, then the client may request a stay of the other
proceeding.25 The MFAA also provides that parties may consent
in writing to be bound by an arbitrator’s award at any time, but
that in the absence of a written agreement to bind, both parties
are entitled to a trial after arbitration is timely sought.26
The court then delved into the decisions in Alternative
Systems and Aguilar, explaining that they were “critical to
understanding” the present case.27 In Alternative Systems, the
client and lawyer had an arbitration agreement but the client
After the MFAA
invoked arbitration under the MFAA.28
arbitration, the client rejected the award and filed for trial de
novo.29 Subsequently, the dispute was litigated by the American
Arbitration Association over the objections of the client who
challenged the arbitrator’s jurisdiction; the arbitrator found for
the attorney and the client filed a motion to vacate the
arbitrator’s award because “contractual arbitration was

20
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28
29

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. (citing Aguilar v. Lerner, 88 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2004)).
Id.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
Id. (citing Alternative Systems v. Carey, 67 Cal.App.4th 1034 (1998)).
Id.
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‘preempted by the MFAA with its right to trial de novo.”30 The
trial court denied the motion but the court of appeal reversed.31
The court of appeal in Alternative Systems emphasized that
the 1996 amendments to the MFAA strengthened client
protections so that stays applied to any proceedings initiated by
an attorney to resolve a fee dispute.32 The court pointed out that
the public policy behind the MFAA was to reduce disparity in
bargaining power in attorney fee matters by providing the client
the opportunity to elect arbitration of a fee dispute, unless that
client has already agreed in writing to arbitrate all fee disputes.33
The court also noted that the MFAA requires a written waiver of
the right to trial de novo after the dispute arises. Additionally,
the court rejected the attorney’s contention that the American
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) arbitration would act as “trial
after arbitration” under the MFAA.34
In Aguilar, the client sued the attorney waiving his right to
MFAA arbitration.35 The attorney filed a motion to compel
binding arbitration under CAA.36 The client opposed, claiming
that under MFAA a client could not be compelled to arbitrate
because arbitration was optional.37 The court found that the
client had waived his rights to the MFAA arbitration and thus,
waived any rights afforded him under the MFAA scheme.38 The
court refused to determine whether the client was able to
overcome the motion to compel had he not waived his MFAA
rights.39 However, in a concurring opinion Justice Chin expressly
addressed that issue.40
First, Justice Chin reiterated the MFAA mandate that an
attorney must inform the client of his or her rights under the
MFAA before or contemporaneous to commencing “an action
[or] . . . any other proceeding against the client under a contract
between attorney and client which provides for an alternative to
arbitration . . . .”41 He emphasized that the “italicized language”
indicated parties may contract to use an alternative proceeding

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id. (italics added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1116.
Id. (citing Aguilar v. Lerner, 88 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2004)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Aguilar, 88 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2004) (Chin, J., concurring)).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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to resolve their dispute rather than resorting to judicial action.42
Justice Chin went on to state that if a client invoked MFAA, the
Act would provide a stay of other proceedings until the MFAA
arbitration was completed; but only until the MFAA arbitration
was completed.43 While Justice Chin acknowledged that the
statutory language of the MFAA lacked clarity, he expressly
rejected the Alternative Systems court’s inference that “the
client’s right to trial de novo trumps contractual obligations
under binding arbitration” stating that such an inference would
render meaningless the MFAA acknowledgement that parties
could consent to a form of dispute resolution other than judicial
action.44 Justice Chin rejected Alternative Systems as illogical
because it provided the client with the means of escaping an
agreement to submit disputes to binding arbitration by simply
asking for nonbinding arbitration.45 The court of appeal in the
instant case dismissed Justice Chin’s analysis, instead choosing
to follow the decision in Alternative Systems, and found that
clients have the “right to trial de novo after nonbinding
arbitration under the MFAA even when they have signed
prospective waivers of trial after arbitration[;]” thus, “the MFAA
trumps the CAA” in those situations.46
The court then looked directly to the statutory language of
the MFAA.47 The court found that the MFAA, when invoked,
provided automatic stays for actions or other proceedings,
including binding arbitration, but that such proceedings would
move forward once MFAA arbitration was completed.48 The
court then rejected Schatz’s argument that the MFAA disallows
binding arbitration, stating that the MFAA “does not foreclose
the possibility that, under a general agreement between the
parties, the nonbinding MFAA process should be followed by
binding arbitration, rather than by lawsuit.”49 The court also
recognized that the MFAA provides for a trail following the
MFAA arbitration, but does not confer “immunity from valid
defenses, such as the existence of a contractual obligation to
arbitrate.”50
Finally, the court considered whether the MFAA impliedly

Id.
Id.
44 Id. at 1116–17 (italics added).
45 Id. at 1117.
46 Id. (citing Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble and Mallory LLP, 146
Cal.App.4th 674 (2007)) (italics added).
47 Id. at 1118.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1119 (emphasis in original).
50 Id.
42
43
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repealed the CAA.51 The court first established that “[a]ll
presumptions are against a repeal by implication” and that an
implied repeal is only found where statutes conflict such that no
harmony can be achieved.52 The court found that the MFAA
could not possibly repeal the CAA because the two acts do not
govern the same subject matter—the MFAA covers “nonbinding
arbitration that the parties did not agree to in advance” and the
CAA covers “binding arbitration agreed to in advance.”53 The
court also acknowledged that the statutes may be reconciled
because each creates a different type of arbitration, both of which
The MFAA creates a nonbinding
may be given effect.54
arbitration; if the arbitration is unsuccessful, the MFAA has
fulfilled its role and the parties may pursue other proceedings
including judicial action or binding arbitration, to resolve the
dispute. In the event the parties selected binding arbitration, or
contracted to such in advance, the CAA would apply.55 The court
identified two anomalies that would be created by interpreting
the MFAA to repeal the CAA: (1) clients would be able to evade
their agreements to arbitrate by requesting and completing
MFAA nonbinding arbitration, thus making a charade out of
MFAA arbitration just to get to trial, and (2) attorneys could
evade their agreements to arbitrate if their clients requested
arbitration under the MFAA, thus a client might not choose to
invoke their MFAA rights because of the chance that the
nonbinding arbitration might fail, and the attorney would
proceed to trial instead of the agreed upon binding arbitration.56
Holding
The court held that “the MFAA does not stand as an obstacle
to the enforcement of a valid agreement to arbitrate pursuant to
the CAA.”57
Legal Significance
The decision establishes that the MFAA and CAA are
designed to work together. The MFAA protects, in the form of
nonbinding arbitration with the potential for trial de novo, clients
who find themselves engaged in fee disputes with their attorney.
Meanwhile, the CAA protects the arbitration agreements entered

51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1120.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1120–21.
Id. at 1121.
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into by both client and attorney. When the MFAA has fulfilled
its role, the CAA takes over.
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